财贸系列 Seminar 第14期
主题：The Tax Gain of Reforming State-owned Enterprises
会议时间：2021 年 9 月 23 日（周四）上午9:00—10:30
会议工具：腾讯会议（ID：363 448 193）
This study examines the tax compliance effect of SOEs reform using a large dataset of Chinese industrial firms. By exploiting the variation in SOEs ownership change—oversight authority shifted from a one level government to either a lower one (i.e., decentralization) or to the private sector (i.e., privatization), we estimate a difference-in-differences model to find that both decentralization and privatization causes an increase in tax compliance as measured by effective tax rates. In addition, we find evidence that while the decentralization results are driven by the reduced distance between a decentralized SOE and its oversight government, the privatization results are solely because of the greater tax-scrutiny. Decentralization and privatization are often seen as strategies to improve efficiency in the affected markets. Our results suggest that governments also benefit from higher tax revenues induced by improvements in tax compliance.
刘勇政，中国人民大学财政金融新万搏体育教授。研究领域为财政学和发展经济学。研究成果发表于 American Economic Journal, Economic Policy, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Journal of Urban Economics,《中国社会科学》《经济研究》等国内外期刊上。曾入选教育部长江学者青年学者、新世纪优秀人才支持计划等项目；曾获中国留美经济学会“最佳青年经济学者奖”、“邹至庄最佳论文奖”、教育部高等学校科学研究优秀成果奖、北京市哲学社会科学优秀成果奖等。目前兼任Applied Economic Analysis(SSCI), Economic and Political Studies 期刊副主编。